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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Amphibious ship lift is crucial in supporting operations of Marine Air Ground
Task Forces (MAGTF) for a wide range of conflicts. This thesis examines three different
aspects of amphibious ship lift capability. First, gross lift capabilities of all amphibious
ships in the Navy today are determined. Since some storage space on board a ship is
required for access, tie-downs, and other considerations, the second step of this thesis is
to use historical load-out data from six-month deployments to derive expected net lift
capability from gross lift capability. A three-ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is
traditionally required to support a six-month MAGTF deployment. The final part of this
thesis utilizes a linear program to determine specific ship combinations that optimize
ARG lift capability for both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets.
The gross capacities of all 42 amphibious ships are determined by collecting and
comparing detailed information from different resources. These results are compiled in
Appendix C, which is a valuable tool allowing ships within a class to compare their
measured capacities. Load-out data is collected from different six-month deployments.
This load-out data is used to calculate broken stowage factors for both vehicle and cargo
stowage areas. Broken stowage factor is the percentage of gross capacity that is actually
used for vehicle or cargo storage. Analysis of variance is used to compare broken
stowage factors between classes of ships and two sample t-tests are used to compare
broken stowage factors between fleets. Results show that statistically, there is no
significant difference between ship classes or fleets, therefore they can all be described in
one group. The resulting vehicle broken stowage factor is 0.70 and the resulting cargo
broken stowage factor is 0.64. Load-out data is also used to determine average landing
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craft load-out. The average landing craft load-out for Landing Craft Air Cushions
(LCACs) and Landing Craft Utilities (LCUs) are 985 and 1490 square feet respectively.
The above information is then utilized to calculate net lift capacity for all 42 ships.
A linear programming model is utilized to determine the best combination of
three ships for each ARG, mixing and matching LPDs and LSDs to the big decks in the
schedule. The best combinations will be that ARG schedule with the greatest minimum
ARG lift capacity in terms of base troop capacity, vehicle square footage, and cargo cubic
footage. In other words the total ARG schedule is only as good as the lift capability of the
ARG with the smallest capacity. Results show that their linear program provides
negligible improvement for the Pacific Fleet. On the other hand, the Atlantic Fleet can be
significantly improved by simply removing the Pensacola and the Portland from the ARG
schedule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Amphibious ship lift is crucial in supporting operations of Marine Air Ground
Task Forces (MAGTF) for a wide range of conflicts. This thesis examines three different
aspects of amphibious ship lift capability. First, gross lift capabilities of all amphibious
ships in the Navy today are determined. Since some storage space on board a ship is
required for access, tie-downs, and other considerations, the second step of this thesis is
to use historical load-out data from six-month deployments to derive expected net lift
capability from gross lift capability. A three-ship Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is
traditionally required to support a six-month MAGTF deployment. The final part of this
thesis utilizes a linear program to determine specific ship combinations that optimize
ARG lift capability for both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets.

II. BACKGROUND
A. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY LIFT STUDY
Approximately every ten years the Department of the Navy reviews amphibious
lift requirements. The most recent study, Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC
Air Support Requirements (1990 DoN Lift) was completed in 1990. One of the many
questions the DoN Lift Study asks is whether there is sufficient amphibious lift capability
for two major regional conflicts. In an attempt to answer this question, the study
compiled a table of "Gross Capacities of Ships and Class Averages" (Annex J of 1990
DoN Lift). Upon close review of this table, several problems are evident. First, the table
appears to be generic in that vehicle storage capacity is reported as being constant within
a class of ship. Furthermore data in the table is inaccurate since there have been many
ship alterations since 1990. A current table is maintained by Combat Cargo Officers
(CCOs) assigned to the staffs of the Commander, Naval Surface Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet
(CNSP) and the Commander, Naval Surface Forces U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CNSL).
B. SHIP'S LOADING CHARACTERISTIC PAMPHLETS
While Annex J of the DoN Lift Study does not consider ship alterations or other
deviations between ships in a class, such information is available from a Ship's Loading
Characteristic Pamphlet (SLCP) that is maintained by each ship. The SLCP provides
updated capacities for each compartment on the ship. It would be natural to assume that
each ship can maintain its SLCP accurately. During research for this thesis, it became
apparent that CCOs at the Commander Amphibious Group level (CPG-1, CPG-2, and
CPG-3) and below strongly believe that the SLCP is consistently the most reliable source
of capacity data. In contrast, interviewed CCOs and other personnel (at CNSL and
OPNAV N-85) above the Commander Amphibious Group level do not share this belief in
SLCP accuracy. Therefore, this thesis will compile SLCPs and compare results with
CNSL and CNSP ship capacity tables to generate an updated Gross Capacity of Ships and
Class Averages table.
C. BROKEN STOWAGE FACTORS
" A broken stowage factor is applied to the available space for embarkation due to
the loss between boxes, between vehicles, around stanchions, and over cargo. The factor
will vary, depending on the type and size of vehicles, type and size of general cargo,
training and experience of loading personnel, type of loading, method of stowage, and
configuration of compartments." (Joint Pub 3-02.2) Usable space is also lost due to
allowance for fire lanes, routine access, tie-downs used to secure cargo, and unit integrity
in a combat load. The broken stowage factor is usually defined as the fraction of space
used for storage, while broken stowage loss is the fraction of unusable space.
Broken stowage factors can be used to estimate net lift capability from gross lift
capability. They are generally used for long-term planning of a mission prior to the
generation of a load plan. In other words, broken stowage factors can be used to estimate
how much cargo a platform can carry for an upcoming or a hypothetical deployment. In
general, broken stowage factors are only for estimates of a ship's net lift capability. Once
a ship's required cargo load has been determined, a detailed load plan designates the
exact position of each piece of cargo.
The method for calculating broken stowage factors (BSF) is simple. The first
equation is for calculating the broken stowage factor for a single cargo stowage area or
for all cargo stowage areas in an entire ship.
_
___ Cargo Loaded (cubic footage)
Cargo BSr
Total or Gross Capacity (cubic footage)
The second equation is the method for calculating the vehicle broken stowage
factor for a single vehicle stowage area . This equation should be used when vehicles
stowed in the well deck are not being considered.
Vehicles and Cargo Loaded (square footage)
Vehicle BSF =
Total or Gross Capacity (square footage)
"Each landing craft carried in amphibious ships has vehicle carrying capacity."
( 1 990 DoN Lift) "Preboat load" refers to the vehicles loaded on those landing craft,
measured in square feet. A third equation is the method for calculating the vehicle
broken stowage factor for all vehicle stowage areas on an entire ship and accounts for the
preboat load in the well deck. This method was used in Annex J of the 1990 DoN Lift
Study and is used in the remainder of this thesis.
Vehicles and Cargo Loaded (square footage) - Preboat Load (square footage)
Vehicle BSF =
Total or Gross Capacity (square footage)
According to Annex J of the DoN Lift study, a 0.70 broken stowage factor should
be used for vehicle stowage areas, which are measured in square feet. For cargo stowage
areas, which are measured in cubic feet, a broken stowage factor of 0.75 was specified.
The main emphasis of this thesis is to derive accurate values of broken stowage factors
from historical data from both fleets.
D. HISTORICAL DATA
Amphibious ship load-outs are generally largest during six-month deployments.
Therefore, historical data used in this thesis was taken predominantly from six-month
deployments that occurred during the past three years. Data is provided by each ship in
the form of detailed load plans and Embarked Personnel Material Reports (EPMRs)
which are examined to determine actual broken stowage factors.
E. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP (ARG) COMBINATIONS
Six-month deployments in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets occur in the
form of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). This ARG typically consists of three
different ships. The largest ship, called the "big deck," is an LPH, LHA, or LHD. These
ships resemble an aircraft carrier and carry the Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The
second ship is an LPD, an amphibious transport dock, which serves as the primary control
ship and also transports and lands Marines by landing craft or by helicopters. The third
ship is an LSD, a dock landing ship also used to transport and land Marines. There are
four different variations of LSDs. The Atlantic Fleet has eighteen amphibious ships
available for six-month deployments: five big decks, five LPDs and eight LSDs. In the
Pacific Fleet, CPG-3 has twelve amphibious ships available for six-month deployments:
four big decks, four LPDs and four LSDs. At least one ARG from each fleet is always on
station, which requires the oncoming ARG to depart prior to the return of the off-going
ARG. Therefore, with six-month underway periods, one rotation through all the
amphibious ships lasts almost two and one half years for the Atlantic Fleet and almost
two years for the Pacific Fleet. A rotation is measured from the beginning of the first
deployment until the completion of the last deployment, so that all ARGs are deployed
once, and no ship is deployed more than once.
The ARG schedule is determined by factors other than ARG lift capability. The
schedule for a single amphibious ship will include a significant maintenance period, a
work-up period of approximately 9 months, and finally, the six-month deployment.
Therefore, a change to the rotation of ships in the ARG schedule is both difficult and
impractical. The purpose of the final portion of this thesis is to provide an alternative
method for planning deployment schedules. A linear programming model is utilized to
determine the best combination of three ships for each ARG, mixing and matching LPDs
and LSDs to the big decks in the schedule. The best combinations will be that ARG
schedule with the greatest minimum ARG lift capacity in terms of base troop capacity,
vehicle square footage, and cargo cubic footage. In other words the total ARG schedule is
only as good as the lift capability of the ARG with the smallest capacity.
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter HI provides the gross capacities of ships
and class averages and explains how these capacities were developed. Chapter IV
explains the resources used for six-month load-outs. It explains the assumptions used and
the calculations necessary to determine broken stowage factors. Chapter V analyzes the
results of broken stowage factor calculations. It examines differences between fleets and
classes of ships. It also reviews the Notional Landing Craft Load-out and Standard
preboat load-out. Chapter VI describes the linear program model to determine the
combinations of three ships that achieve the greatest minimum lift capability throughout
the ARG schedule for both the Pacific and the Atlantic Fleets. Chapter VII summarizes
the results and conclusions.

III. SHIP GROSS LIFT CAPACITIES
A. GROSS CAPACITIES OF SHIPS AND CLASS AVERAGES TABLE
The first step in calculating broken stowage factors is to determine accurate
measures of total gross space available for each ship. Two such measures are routinely
used: square footage and cubic footage available. Additional parameters are also
collected to create a table similar to Annex J of the 1990 DoN Lift Study. The Gross
Capacities of Ships and Class Averages Table (Appendix B) includes the following
information:
1. Troop Bunks: Gross troop capacity in terms of base, surge and their combined
total. Base is the total number of permanent troop bunks available.
2. Gross Vehicle Square Footage: "The entire deck area available for routine
vehicle stowage excluding unacceptable areas and fire lanes." (1990 DoN Lift) Square
footage available within embarked landing craft is not included in this area.
3. Gross Cargo Cubic Footage: The available deck area multiplied by the
allowable stowage height of the compartment. Allowable stowage height is the total
height minus obstructions and the space required for proper sprinkler dispersion pattern
as defined in the 1990 DoN Lift Study.
4. Bulk POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants): The total bulk Diesel Fuel Marine
(DFM), aviation fuel (JP-5), and motor gasoline (MOGAS) includes only internal tankage
for both landing force and ship propulsion.
5. SLCP Approval Date: The signature date or date of validation for each SLCP.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GROSS CAPACITIES OF SHIPS AND CLASS
AVERAGES TABLE
Using the resources shown below, vehicle square footage and cargo cubic footage
have been developed for each ship.
1. SLCPs obtained for 36 of 42 amphibious ships
2. Embarkation Lift Data from CNSL
3. Capacity of Pacific Fleet Amphibious Ships from CNSP
4. 1990 DoN Lift Study, Annex J
Capacity information provided by these resources is generally inconsistent.
Appendix C summarizes the data provided (LST, LCC, and LPH class ships are not
listed) including correct SLCP totals for each ship. Vehicle square footage is presented by
compartment and cargo cubic footage is presented by cargo type to provide consistency
for each class of ship.
Capacity estimates are refined by a thorough analysis to resolve the previously
mentioned inconsistencies. In all cases, capacity data in the 1990 DoN Lift Study, Annex
J, is outdated or incorrect. Consequently, capacity information from this resource is
eliminated from further consideration. Sections I and VIH of each SLCP contain vehicle
square footage and cargo cubic footage data. Section I provides Troop Cargo Capacities
and Section VIH gives the Troop Cargo Space Capability Breakdown. While
theoretically identical, totals from these two sections do not always agree with each other.
Total capacities reported in some SLCPs include compartments or types of cargo that are
omitted in other SLCPs of the same class of ship. Other inconsistencies are noted when
comparing data reported in the SLCPs with data provided by CNSL or CNSP.
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Using vehicle square footage and cargo cubic footage as the two measures of
capacity for the 42 amphibious ships gives the 84 measures of capacity used in this study.
On ten ships, both square footage and cubic footage from SLCP totals agree with
capacities reported by CNS(P/L). On nine other ships, cubic footage from SLCP totals
agree with capacities reported by CNS(P/L) while square footage reports disagree. On
another four ships, square footage from SLCP totals agree with capacities reported by
CNS(P/L) while cubic footage reports disagree. In three other instances, reported
capacities differ by fewer than 20 units, which is taken to be negligible. For six ships, no
SLCP is available and the CNS(P/L) data is assumed to be correct. Thus, of the 84
measures of capacity, 48 are considered to be known accurately.
The 36 remaining capacities require additional analysis to resolve disparities
between SLCP totals and CNS(P/L) data. Several factors are considered in determining
the correct capacity in these cases. For three entries, totals in the SLCP agree with
capacities reported by CNS(P/L) even though individual entries in the SLCP do not add
up to the reported total. Correlation between ships in a class is expected and can be
exploited. Available Equipment Personnel Manning Reports (EPMRs) and resulting
broken stowage factor calculations also help to determine the correct capacity (explained
in Chapter IV). In many cases the smaller of the two capacities reported for a ship is
discarded because it leads to an infeasible broken stowage factor. Troop bunks and bulk
POL data is based primarily on SLCPs. Data from CNSP or CNSL is only used when the
SLCP is not available.
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IV. BROKEN STOWAGE FACTOR CALCULATIONS
A. EMBARKED PERSONNEL MATERIAL REPORTS
The correct way to calculate broken stowage factors is to know exactly what is
stored in vehicle stowage spaces and what is stored in cargo stowage spaces, and then to
divide the space used by the total or gross capacity. Unfortunately the location of
vehicles and cargo is not always provided. This chapter explains the assumptions made to
derive broken stowage factors using only the information from Embarked Personnel
Material Reports (EPMRs) and a limited number of Detailed Load Plans.
Load-outs for six-month deployments are expected to be larger than other
underway periods. Going back as far as three years, 3 1 EPMRs, exclusively from six-
month deployments, were easily collected. However, since load plans are not consistently
kept, only seven load plans were available for the above deployments. Of these seven,
three load plans are incomplete because they do not include Landing Forces Operational
Reserve Material (LFORM). One additional EPMR used from the Belleau Wood is not
for a six-month deployment, but appears to be a full load-out. Using the Belleau Wood
provides EPMRs for a total of four LHAs, two from each fleet, and increases the total
sample size to 32.
EPMRs provide a good list of vehicle and cargo in terms of square footage and
cubic footage, but they do not always list where that cargo is stowed (with the exception
of vehicles loaded on landing craft). In seven EPMRs (without Detailed Load Plans) the
information provided is detailed enough that an accurate location of vehicle and cargo can
reasonably be determined. An EPMR contains six sections that describe the cargo load-
out. Section D is the Lift Summary and should list all cargo in either square feet or cubic
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feet, or both. The primary cargo categories included in the Lift Summary are Aircraft
(square footage), Vehicles (square footage), Outsized Cargo (square footage and cubic
footage), Organizational Cargo (cubic footage) and LFORM (cubic footage). Aircraft are
generally stowed in a hangar bay or on a flight deck and are not included in the broken
stowage factor calculations. Section E is the Space Available, that is, the space remaining
for more cargo after the load-out is complete. Space Available is listed for General
Cargo, Ammunition, and Pyrotechnic areas in cubic feet and for the Flight Deck (when
used for vehicle stowage), Well Deck, Vehicle, and Landing Craft stowage areas in
square feet. Section G is the Organizational Recap and lists the organizations embarked
together with each organization's aircraft, vehicles, outsized cargo, landing craft
embarked, and vehicles loaded in the landing craft as well as a cargo summary. Section
H is a description of LFORM broken down by class. Finally, Sections I and J describe
other contingency assets (Other PWR Assets and the Opportune Lift).
A detailed spreadsheet (not attached) has been developed to ensure that the total
space for vehicles, outsized cargo, organizational cargo, and LFORM listed in the
Organizational Recap and LFORM sections matches the Lift Summary section.
Generally it does match; however in a few instances data from the Organizational Recap
or LFORM sections does not match those from the Lift Summary, so the larger totals are
assumed to be more complete and correct. For the most part, Organizational Recaps from
the Pacific Fleet include only numbers and descriptions of cargo loaded, and do not
include square footage or cubic footage. Most outsized cargo is listed in both square
footage and cubic footage, but there are some occasions where a small portion of outsized
cargo or organizational cargo is listed in only one measurement. On those occasions the
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missing measurement is interpolated from outsized cargo for which both measures are
provided. In almost all cases, outsized cargo and organizational cargo averaged 7.2 feet
in height (that is, the ratio of volume to area averaged 7.2 feet). If, for example, only
cubic footage is provided, then square footage is interpolated by dividing the cubic
footage by 7.2 feet. The importance of outsized cargo and organizational cargo being
represented in both area and volume will become apparent later in this chapter.
B. VEHICLE STOWAGE ASSUMPTIONS
The first assumption is that all vehicles are stowed in vehicle stowage areas. In
most cases vehicles are not stowed in cargo stowage areas, so this is a very reasonable
assumption. Vehicles are also reported stowed onboard landing craft as part of the
preboat load. It should be noted that on six EPMRs, it is specifically reported that a small
portion of either outsized cargo or organizational cargo is stored in vehicle stowage areas.
That small portion of cargo is included in vehicle square footage totals.
C. CARGO STOWAGE
A natural assumption is that all outsized cargo is stored in vehicle storage areas
and all remaining cargo is stored in cargo stowage areas. After reviewing the results in
Table D. 1 of Appendix D, however, this assumption proves to be untenable. In numerous
cases, this would require that vehicle or cargo broken stowage factors exceed 1.0, and in a
few cases approach 2.0. Of course a broken stowage factor greater than one is
impossible. Conversely, several cargo broken stowage factors are extremely low.
Additionally, the difference between vehicle and cargo broken stowage factors, which is
expected to be small, can be in these cases as large as 1.548. With vehicle broken
stowage factors exceeding 1 .0, it is clear that at least a fraction of the outsized cargo is
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being stored in cargo storage areas. In other cases, with cargo broken stowage factors
exceeding 1 .0, it is clear that at least a fraction of non-outsized cargo is being stored in
vehicle storage areas. The sizes of those fractions in some cases is unknown.
D. 6.9 PERCENT DIFFERENCE IN BROKEN STOWAGE FACTORS
The results from the eleven ships, four with complete Detailed Load Plans and
seven with detailed EPMRs show that an average cargo broken stowage factor of 0.661
and an average vehicle broken stowage factor of 0.73, a difference of 0.069. Therefore,
the next tentative assumption is that a vehicle broken stowage factor is always 0.069
larger than the cargo broken stowage factor on the same ship. The results of this
assumption are displayed in Table D.2 of Appendix D. This assumption is too restrictive
since a difference of 0.069 may not be valid for all ships. It does, however, provide a
good starting point to compare a single artificial broken stowage factor between ships and
to validate results.
In some cases, like that of the Wasp, a 6.9 percent difference (vehicle broken
stowage greater than cargo broken stowage) could be achieved by assuming that a portion
of outsized cargo was stored in vehicle storage areas and the remainder in cargo storage
areas. (For the purpose of this analysis, cargo is categorized as either "outsized" or
"regular." Regular cargo is defined as all cargo that is not outsized.) If a 6.9 percent
difference is achievable with only outsized cargo, then all regular cargo is assumed to be
stored in cargo storage areas. As a result, a value of zero is used for both Undesignated
Cargo columns in Table D.2 of Appendix D. Otherwise, regular cargo will need to be
considered to be stored in vehicle storage areas. ("Undesignated Cargo" gives the area of
that regular cargo which might be stored in either location.) If for example, a 6.9 percent
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difference cannot be achieved with outsized cargo alone, as on the Ogden, a portion of
regular cargo, either organizational cargo or LFORM, is assumed to have been stored in
the vehicle storage areas. In these cases, the relevant volume of regular cargo has been
subtracted from Regular Cargo and then listed in Undesignated Cargo of Table D.2 of
Appendix D. Therefore, the sum of Regular Cargo and Undesignated Cargo on the cargo
side of Appendix D, Table D.2, represents the total cubic footage of regular cargo. The
value (in cubic feet) used for Undesignated Cargo in the cargo side of the table is also
used in the Undesignated Cargo column on the vehicle side after conversion to square
footage. Similarly, the value (in cubic footage) used for Outsized Cargo is also listed on
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'^able 4.1. USS Ponce (LPD-15) 6.9 Percent Difference in Broken Stowage Factors
The Ponce provides a good example of the above process (see Table 4.1 above).
A total of 39, 1 84 (6,466 + 32,7 1 8) cubic feet of regular cargo was loaded. If all of this
regular cargo were to have been loaded in cargo stowage spaces, a 6.9 percent difference
could not have been achieved. Therefore, it is assumed that a portion of that regular
cargo, in this case 32,718 cubic feet, may have been stowed in vehicle stowage areas.
Then 32,718 cubic feet is subtracted from the Regular Cargo column. The Regular Cargo
column becomes 6,466 (39,184 - 32,718) cubic feet, which is assumed to have been
stowed in cargo stowage areas. The 32,718 cubic feet now listed in the Undesignated
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Cargo column on the cargo side measures approximately 4,6 1 1 square feet in area; that
amount is listed in the Undesignated Cargo column on the vehicle side of the table.
Similarly, 14,460 cubic feet of outsized cargo is equivalent to 2,518 square feet and it is
this value that is listed in the Outsized Cargo column on the vehicle side.
Finally, the %Cargo in Vehicle column of Table 2 is the percentage of
Undesignated Cargo and Outsized Cargo that must have been stowed in vehicle stowage
areas to achieve a 6.9 percent difference between cargo and vehicle broken stowage
factors. For example, on the Ponce, 50.5% of Undesignated Cargo and Outsized Cargo
would have to have been stored in vehicle storage areas to achieve a 6.9 percent
difference. Therefore the values for Undesignated Cargo and Outsized Cargo columns
are multiplied by 0.505 on the vehicle square footage side. These products are added to
the Vehicle Reported column to produce the Vehicle Loaded column (total square footage
loaded in vehicle storage areas). In the case of the Ponce, 8,572 + 0.505 * (4,61 1 +
2,518) = 12,172 is the square feet of Vehicle Loaded. On the cargo side, the
Undesignated Cargo and Outsized Cargo columns on the cargo cubic footage side are
multiplied by 0.495 (1-0.505). The products are added to the Regular Cargo column to
achieve the Cargo Loaded column (total cubic footage loaded in cargo storage areas). In
the case of the Ponce, 6,466 + 0.495 * (32,718 + 14,460) = 29,819 is the cubic feet of
Cargo Loaded. Therefore all cargo, both regular and outsized, has been included only
once.
Four ships (Shreveport (97), Ashland, Carter Hall, and Oak Hill) are highlighted
in Appendix D because their actual broken stowage factors are determined from detailed
load plans. Seven ships (Wasp, Essex, Kearsarge, Peleliu, Guam(Oct 97), Austin,
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Ogden) are highlighted in Appendix D because the information in their EPMRs is
detailed enough that an accurate location of vehicle and cargo can reasonably be
determined. Even when all regular and outsized cargo on the Harpers Ferry is considered
to have been stored in cargo storage areas, a 6.9 percent difference could not be achieved.
Both broken stowage factors for the Fort Fisher greatly exceeded 1.0; therefore, it is
assumed that the Fort Fisher's EPMR is incorrect and as a result, the Fort Fisher is
excluded from the remaining portion of the analysis.
E. REDUCED RANGES
As stated previously, a problem with the 6.9 percent difference assumption is that
it is too restrictive. Such an assumption implies that all ships have the same differences
between cargo and vehicle broken stowage factors, which is unlikely. Returning to the
original problem, it is known how much cargo is loaded on each ship. With the exception
of eleven ships, the location of that cargo, however, is not known. In order to reduce the
possible range of broken stowage factors and to better estimate the actual broken storage
factor values, three new general assumptions are applied. The first of these assumptions
is that all broken stowage factors are less than 0.95. The second is that all broken
stowage factors are greater than 0.55. The last of these three assumptions is that the
difference between broken stowage factors (ignoring sign) is less than 0.25.
The results of these three assumptions are shown on Table D.3 of appendix D.
"Low %Cargo in Vehicle" is the lowest percentage of cargo that could be stored in
vehicle stowage areas and still satisfy the three above assumptions. "High %Cargo in
Vehicle" is the highest percentage of cargo that could be stowed in vehicle stowage areas
and still satisfy the three above assumptions. The resulting reduced ranges are displayed
19
in Figures D.4 and D.5 of Appendix D. This considerably reduces the possible range of
vehicle broken stowage factors and slightly reduces the possible range of cargo broken
stowage factors.
F. FINAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CALCULATIONS
The assumptions up to this point are all quite reasonable:
1
.
All vehicle square footage is assumed to be stowed in vehicle stowage areas.
2. A vehicle broken stowage factor 6.9 percent greater than cargo stowage factor
is assumed to be achievable.
3. Broken stowage factors are assumed to be greater than 0.55 and less than 0.95.
4. The absolute difference between cargo broken stowage factors and vehicle
stowage factors is assumed to be less than 0.25.
Under these assumptions, the vehicle broken stowage factor generally takes on a
smaller range for each ship then does the cargo broken stowage factor. The results from
the eleven ships with Detailed Load Plans or detailed EPMRs show that the average
vehicle broken stowage factor is 0.73. It is then assumed that all ships carry vehicles of
similar types and composition. Combined with the general knowledge that all ships use
the same type of tie-downs to secure vehicles and do so in a similar manner, it appears
reasonable to conclude that all vehicle broken stowage factors are nearly 0.73. The
percent of cargo that must be stowed in vehicle stowage areas to achieve a vehicle broken
stowage factor of 0.73 (or as close to 0.73 as possible) while still satisfying the four
assumptions above is displayed in the "0.73 Vehicle" column in Table D.3, Appendix D.
This approach produces several cargo broken stowage factors of either exactly 0.55 or
0.95. The final alternative value of percent cargo in vehicle stowage areas (for ships
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without detailed load plans) is developed by taking the average of percent cargo in
vehicle stowage areas needed to achieve a vehicle broken storage factor of 0.73 or close
to it (0.73 Vehicle) and the %Cargo in Vehicle from the 6.9 percent Difference Broken
Stowage Factor Table (6.9 Percent).
[(0.73 Vehicle) + (6.9 Percent)] .
— —
i
= Final % Cargo in Vehicle Stowage Areas
The calculations to estimate actual %Cargo in Vehicle are displayed in Table D.3
of Appendix D. The final calculated broken stowage factors are in Table D.6 of
Appendix D. Further evidence that these estimates are reasonable is seen in the small
deviation of the average vehicle broken stowage factor from the results in the 6.9 percent
difference table, a difference of only 0.004. These calculations in Table D.6 are




V. ANALYSIS OF BROKEN STOWAGE FACTORS AND LOAD-OUTS
LANDING CRAFT
1. Notional Landing Craft Load-Out
"In order to calculate the amount of additional lift provided due to landing craft
considerations, it is necessary to establish a notional boat plan." (1990 DoN Lift) In this
context, a notional boat plan is the ideal number of landing craft loaded for each type of
ship. In Annex J of the 1990 DoN Lift Study "this is accomplished by first loading
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) to capacity in all potential LCAC-capable ships. The
best fit of boats is then used to fill any remaining boat well space." The LCAC is clearly
the landing craft of choice for over-the-horizon missions, "combining heavy lift
capability of the surface assault with the high speeds of helicopterborne assault."
(FMFRP 1-18)
1990 DoN Lift
Notional Landing Craft Load-out
LCAC LCU LCM8
LHD 3








This method of determining landing craft load-out is appropriate when planning
for a single combat mission or amphibious assault. This was the reasoning applied
according to Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey M. Parkinson who was the Amphibious
Requirements Officer at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps just prior to publishing the
1990 DoN Lift Study. This table is not, however, appropriate when considering six-
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month deployments because six-month deployments generally include multiple missions
or contingency plans. In addition, Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM-8) boats are rarely
used. For the purpose of this thesis the following table reflects the notional landing craft
load-out for a six-month deployment.
Six-Month Deployment











This table reflects a typical load-out for six-month deployments. It is different
from the 1990 Notional Landing Craft Load-out table only for the LHA and LPD-4
classes. It was developed using the 32 EPMRs discussed in Chapter IV and was
confirmed by Major J. B. Scruggs, the Combat Cargo Officer for Commander,
Amphibious Group Two.
2. Standard Preboat Load-Outs
a. Standard Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Preboat Load-Out
From the original sample set of 32 ship deployments, only ten were ships
that embarked (loaded) LCACs. Out of those ten ships, only four provided the preboat
load-out in square feet in their EPMR for a total of 13 LCACs. The following table lists
this sample set of LCAC preboat load-outs (the three entries for the Kearsarge are from a







Kearsarge 1 839 839
Kearsarge 1 718 718
Kearsarge 1 733 733
Ashland 4 4197 1049
Pensacola 3 3148 1049
Wasp 3 3173 1058
Annex J of the DoN Lift Study states "the average square feet of vehicles
preloaded in the high threat case is about 750 SQFT; in the mid and low cases, about 700
SQFT. A reasonable average load which accounts for variations in landing plans is 720
SQFT" (original emphasis). This average LCAC preboat load-out number is used to
calculate net ship lift capacity. However, the LCAC sample set has a mean of 985 square
feet with a 95-percent confidence interval of approximately +/- 78 square feet (assuming
constant area for LCACs aboard a ship, with the exception of the Kearsarge) and is









Confidence Interval (95.0%) 78.2
b. Standard Landing Craft Utility (LCU) Preboat Load-Out
Sixteen amphibious ships from the original sample set of 32 EPMRs
embarked LCUs. Out of those sixteen ships, twelve provided the preboat load-out in
square footage for a total of 18 LCUs. The following table lists this sample set of LCU
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preboat load-outs (the four entries for the Saipan are from a single deployment but were






Shreveport (97) 1521 1521
Ponce 1504 1504





Nassau 4 3348 837
Trenton (Jan 98) 1348 1348
Trenton (Jan 96) 1369 1369
Carter Hall 1593 1593
Portland (Jan 98) 1426 1426
Portland (Jan 96) 1580 1580
Shreveport (Aug 95) 676 676
Austin 1654 1654
Annex J of the DoN Lift Study suggests that 1980 square feet is the
standard preboat load-out for LCUs, and it uses this number to calculate ship net lift
capacity. In contrast, the Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book (FMFRP 1-18)
states that the cargo deck capacity for an LCU is 1850 square feet. The largest preboat
load-out from the LCU sample set is 1654. This total sample set has a mean of 1255
square feet with a 95-percent confidence interval of approximately +/- 350 square feet
(assuming constant area for LCUs aboard the Nassau). Six of the eighteen LCUs (33
percent) have a preboat load-out of less than 838 square feet. The remaining LCUs all
have a preboat load-out greater than 1 347 square feet. There is a considerable gap
between these two groups. One reason for samples less than 838 square feet could be
that these preboat load-outs allocate space for carrying troops. It is assumed that these
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two groups do not come from a common distribution. Therefore, the smaller preboat
load-outs are omitted to ensure we are using only completely full LCUs. The remaining
sample set has a mean of 1488 square feet with a 95-percent confidence interval of
approximately +/- 58 square feet (assuming constant area for LCUs aboard the Nassau)
and is expected to more accurately represent the standard LCU preboat load-out. The










B. VEHICLE BROKEN STOWAGE FACTORS
1. Comparison Between Ship Classes
The following table lists in order of ship class, vehicle broken stowage factors
from the data provided in Table D.6 of Appendix D. Data from the Guam has been
excluded since the last LPH has been scheduled for decommissioning in 1998. Also







Wasp LHD 0.761 5
Essex LHD 0.615 24
Kearsarge LHD 0.742 7
Boxer LHD 0.765 4
Saipan LHA 0.720 14
Belleau Wood LHA 0.582 27
Nassau LHA 0.688 20
Peleliu LHA 0.608 25
Austin LPD 0.707 16
Ogden LPD 0.824 1
Cleveland LPD 0.562 28
Juneau LPD 0.747 6
Shreveport (97) LPD 0.689 19
Shreveport (Aug 95) LPD 0.678 21
Nashville LPD 0.701 17
Trenton (Jan 98) LPD 0.733 10
Trenton (Jan 96) LPD 0.739 9
Ponce LPD 0.699 18
Portland (Jan 98) LSD-36 0.722 13
Portland (Jan 96) LSD-36 0.668 22
Pensacola LSD-36 0.644 23
Whidbey Island LSD-41 0.777 3
Comstock LSD-41 0.599 26
Tortuga LSD-41 0.740 8
Ashland LSD-41 0.709 15
Harpers Ferry LSD-49 0.726 12
Carter Hall LSD-49 0.728 11
Oak Hill LSD-49 0.790 2
La Moure County LST 0.555 29
The La Moure County will be dismissed since one sample from the LST class is
insufficient to accurately represent that class of ship. When determining if the remaining
six classes can be grouped together it must be determined whether the vehicle broken
stowage factors from the different classes behave like independent samples from a
common distribution. The null hypothesis (H ) is that the entire sample set is from a
common distribution. The alternative hypothesis (Hi) then is that the entire sample set is
not from a common distribution.
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Boxplots comparing Vehicle Broken Stowage Factors between Class
!
i
LHD LPO LSD36 LSD41 LSD49
Analysis of Variance Table
Df Sum of Sq
Class 5 0.0209
Residuals 22 0.0907
Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
0.0042 1.0150 0.4326
0. 0041
An analysis of variance of these six classes with the usual assumptions (random
samples from a normal population and constant variance) results in a p-value of 0.433.
The null hypothesis (Ho) fails to be rejected; therefore the entire sample set is assumed to
be from a common distribution. From the sample of 28 ships it has been determined that
in order to predict vehicle broken stowage factors, all classes of ships can best be
described in one single group. The mean vehicle broken stowage factor is estimated to be
0.702 with a 95-percent confidence interval of +/- 0.025.









The LST and LSD36M classes are not adequately represented in the sample set.
However, it is expected that the LST and the LSD36M classes will behave like the other
classes.










Shreveport (97) LPD 0.689
Shreveport (Aug 95) LPD 0.678
Nashville LPD 0.701
Trenton (Jan 98) LPD 0.733
Trenton (Jan 96) LPD 0.739
Ponce LPD 0.699
Portland (Jan 98) LSD36 0.722
Portland (Jan 96) LSD36 0.668
Pensacola LSD36 0.644
Whidbey Island LSD41 0.777
Tortuga LSD41 0.740
Ashland LSD41 0.709
Carter Hall LSD49 0.728













Harpers Ferry LSD49 0.726
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In the sample sets above the Atlantic Fleet achieves a mean value of 0.718 and the
Pacific Fleet achieves a mean value of 0.67. Since the variances of the underlying
populations may not be identical, a Welch Modified Two-Sample t-Test is used.
Comparing the mean values of the two fleets results in a p-value of 0.1841 (bigger than
the usual critical value of .05). Therefore, assuming that the values represent random
samples, it is not clear whether the population from which Atlantic Fleet data is drawn
has a mean vehicle broken stowage factor higher than that of the Pacific Fleet. Boxplots
of the two fleets are provided below:
Welch Modified Two-Sample t-Test
t = 1.4368, df = 9.132, p-value = 0.1841
alternative hypothesis : true difference in means is not
equal to
95 percent confidence interval:
-0.0273 0.1231
sample estimates:
mean of x mean of y
0.7179 0.67
Boxplots comparing Vehicle Broken Stowage Factors between Fleets
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C. CARGO BROKEN STOWAGE FACTORS
1. Comparison Between Ship Classes
The following table lists in order of ship class, cargo broken stowage factors from
the data provided in Table D.4 of Appendix D. Data from the Guam has been excluded
since the last LPH has been scheduled for decommissioning in 1998. Also given are






Wasp LHD 0.589 16
Essex LHD 0.569 22
Kearsarge LHD 0.756 6
Boxer LHD 0.774 5
Saipan LHA 0.479 29
Belleau Wood LHA 0.584 17
Nassau LHA 0.573 21
Peleliu LHA 0.559 21
Austin LPD 0.732 7
Ogden LPD 0.628 11
Cleveland LPD 0.528 27
Juneau LPD 0.730 8
Shreveport (97) LPD 0.830 3
Shreveport (Aug 95) LPD 0.595 15
Nashville LPD 0.584 18
Trenton (Jan 98) LPD 0.675 10
Trenton (Jan 96) LPD 0.697 9
Ponce LPD 0.582 19
Portland (Jan 98) LSD36 0.599 14
Portland (Jan 96) LSD36 0.574 20
Pensacola LSD36 0.562 23
Whidbey Island LSD41 0.832 2
Comstock LSD41 0.541 26
Tortuga LSD41 0.814 4
Ashland LSD41 0.622 12
Harpers Ferry LSD49 0.549 25
Carter Hall LSD49 0.838 1
Oak Hill LSD49 0.615 13
La Moure County LST 0.517 28
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The La Moure County will be dismissed since one sample from the LST class is
insufficient to accurately represent that class of ship. Once again, when determining if
the remaining six classes can be grouped together it must be determined whether the
cargo broken stowage factors from different classes behave like independent samples
from a common distribution. The null hypothesis (H ) is that the entire sample set is from
a common distribution. The alternative hypothesis (Hi) then is that the entire sample set
is not from a common distribution.
Boxplots comparing Cargo Broken Stowage Factors between Classes
LHA LHD LPD LSD36 LSD41 LS049
Analysis of Variance Table
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Class 5 0.0696 0.0139 1.3588 0.2776
Residuals 22 0.2252 0.0102
An analysis of variance of these six classes with the usual assumptions (random
samples from a normal population and constant variance) results in a p-value of 0.278.
The null hypothesis (Ho) fails to be rejected; therefore the entire sample set is assumed to
be from a common distribution. From the sample of 28 ships it has been determined that
in order to predict cargo broken stowage factors, all classes of ships can best be described
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by one single group. The mean cargo broken stowage factor is estimated to be 0.643 with
a 95 percent confidence interval of +/- 0.041.








The LST and LSD36M classes are not adequately represented in the sample set.
However, it is expected that the LST and LSD36M classes will behave like the other
classes.
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Shreveport (97) LPD 0.830
Shreveport (Aug 95) LPD 0.595
Nashville LPD 0.584
Trenton (Jan 98) LPD 0.675
Trenton (Jan 96) LPD 0.697
Ponce LPD 0.582
Portland (Jan 98) LSD36 0.599
Portland (Jan 96) LSD36 0.574
Pensacola LSD36 0.562
Whidbey Island LSD41 0.832
Tortuga LSD41 0.814
Ashland LSD41 0.622
Carter Hall LSD49 0.838













Harpers Ferry LSD49 0.549
In the sample sets above the Atlantic Fleet achieves a mean value of 0.66 and the
Pacific Fleet achieves a mean value of 0.607. Since the variances of the underlying
populations may not be identical, a Welch Modified Two-Sample t-Test is used.
Comparing the mean values of the two fleets results in a p-value of 0. 1845. Therefore,
assuming that the values represent random samples, it is not clear whether the population
from which the Atlantic Fleet data is drawn has a mean cargo broken stowage factor
higher than that of the Pacific Fleet. Boxplots of the two fleets are provided below:
Welch Modified Two-Sample t-Test
t = 1.375, df = 19.767, p-value = 0.1845
alternative hypothesis : true difference in means is not
equal to




mean of x mean of y
0.6595 0.6067
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Boxplots comparing Cargo Broken Stowage Factors between Fleets
D. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP (ARG) LOAD-OUTS
There appears to be little gained by analyzing the load-outs of the ARGs as a
group. There are no apparent trends in the amount of vehicle or cargo loaded or in
broken stowage factors of ARGs. The table below provides the ships in each ARG,
square feet of vehicle and cargo stowed in vehicle stowage areas (Vehicle Loaded),
vehicle broken stowage factor (VBSF), cubic feet of cargo stowed in cargo stowage areas
(Cargo Loaded), and the cargo broken stowage factor (CBSF) for each ship. Gunston
Hall and Fort Fisher were not provided in the sample set, so the numbers from these two
ships were interpolated using the averages for all LSDs. While most ARGs deploy with
three ships, the Guam has regularly deployed with four ships in its ARG because the LPH
class does not carry landing craft.
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Big Vehicle Cargo
Deck Loaded VBSF Leaded CBSF
Vehicle Cargo
LPD Loaded VBSF Loaded CBSF
Vehicle Cargo
LSD Loaded VBSF Loaded CBSF










Jul-96 Saipani 24109 0.720 92093 0.479 Austin 12155 0707 39257 0.732 Gunston 13994 0712 15765 0.633
Oct-96 Essex 17790 0.615 82505 0369 Qevela 9183 0.562 24594 0328 Harpers 14165 0.726 38234 0.549
Dec-96 Nassai 22060 0.688 117604 0.573 Nashvil 15992 0701 25869 0.584 Pensacol 10390 0.644 2541 0362
Ivfer-97 Boxer 22251 0.765 112136 0.774 Ogden 11390 0.824 27643 0.628 Fort fish) 13994 0.712 15765 0.633
Apr-97 Kearss 19378 0742 126260 0.756 Ponce 12407 0.699 28262 0.582 Carter H 16975 0.728 24651 0.838
Aug-97 Pelelii 19487 0.608 88708 0.559 Juneau 10361 0.747 35614 0.730 Comstoc 13807 0.599 1654 0.541










Jan-98 Wasp 20654 0.761 63537 0389 Trentor 14376 0.733 38151 0.675 Portland 9467 0.722 1096 0399
AVG* 20818 0.700 97549 0.614 AVG 12370 0.711 33135 0.665 AVG 13994 0.712 15765 0.633
* AVG of Big Decks dees not include Guam deployments
Each ARG is named after its big deck. In the table below, total ARG square feet
of vehicle and cargo stowed in vehicle stowage areas (Total Vehicle) and total ARG
cubic feet of cargo stowed in cargo stowage areas (Total Cargo) are provided for each
ARG. The mean (AVG), standard deviation (STD DEV) and range for both vehicle
broken stowage factors (VBSF), and the cargo broken stowage factors (CBSF) are
provided for all ships in each ARG. The bottom of the table provides the mean (AVG),


















Jan-96 Guam 44426 0.733 0.049 0.120 84147 0.722 0.112 0.241
Jul-96 Saipan 50258 0.713 0.007 0.013 147115 0.615 0.127 0.253
Oct-96 Essex 41138 0.634 0.084 0.164 145333 0.549 0.021 0.041
Dec-96 Nassau 48442 0.678 0.030 0.056 146014 0.573 0.011 0.022
Mar-97 Boxer 47636 0.767 0.056 0.112 155543 0.678 0.083 0.145
Apr-97 Kearsarge 48760 0.723 0.022 0.043 179173 0.726 0.131 0.256
Aug-97 Peleliu 43655 0.651 0.083 0.147 125976 0.610 0.105 0.189
Oct-97 Guam 47897 0.762 0.078 0.170 115725 0.695 0.101 0.215
Jan-98 Wasp 44497 0.739 0.020 0.039 102784 0.621 0.047 0.086
AVG 46301 0.711 0.048 0.096 133534 0.643 0.082 0.161
MIN 41138 0.634 0.007 0.013 84147 0.549 0.011 0.022
MAX 50258 0.767 0.084 0.170 179173 0.726 0.131 0.256
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VI. DETERMINING AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS (ARGs)
A. SCHEDULING DISCLAIMER
In both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets an ARG is deployed for six-months at a
time. An ARG traditionally consists of three ships: one big deck (LHA or LHD), one
LPD, and one LSD. An ARG is generally always on station (Atlantic Fleet in the
Mediterranean and the Pacific Fleet in the Western Pacific), which requires the oncoming
ARG to arrive on station prior to the off-going ARG's departure. The schedule for a
single amphibious ship may include a significant maintenance period, a work-up period
of approximately 9 months, and finally, the six-month deployment in an ARG.
Unplanned vacancies in the ARG schedule are generally filled by determining which
amphibious ship is furthest along in its schedule and most ready for a six-month
deployment. Therefore, it is conceded that the primary consideration in determining
ARG schedules is not lift capability and that a change to the ARG schedule is extremely
difficult and impractical. For purposes of this chapter, the number of schedule changes
required to implement a proposed schedule is disregarded.
B. WORST-CASE LIFT CAPACITY
This chapter provides an example of scheduling using a linear programming
model. It examines the possible benefits of creating an ARG schedule based primarily on
lift capacity. The measure of effectiveness is "worst-case ARG lift capacity": an ARG
schedule is assumed to be only as good as the ARG with the smallest lift capacity. The
best schedule is therefore the schedule providing the greatest minimum (i.e., best worst-
case) ARG lift capacity. Lift capacity is measured in terms of base troop capacity, net
vehicle square footage, and net cargo cubic footage. The capacities used are explained in
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Chapter VII and provided in the Net Capacities of Ships and Class Averages Table in
Appendix E. It is assumed that each ARG requires one big deck, one LPD, and one LSD.
C. LINEAR PROGRAM MODEL
A mixed integer linear programming model is utilized to determine the best
combinations of three ships for each ARG by mixing and matching LPDs and LSDs to
the big decks in the schedule. This section defines requisite sets and indices, data
elements, and decision variables and is followed by the model formulation.
Sets and Indices
/ Type of Amphibious Ship (e.g., Big Deck, LPD, or LSD);
j Individual Amphibious Ship available for ARG schedule (e.g., Essex,
Denver, Comstock,...);




Troop base capacity for ship j of type i (troops);
Vehicle
ij
Net vehicle capacity for ship j of type i (square feet);
Cargo
tj
Net cargo capacity for ship j of type i (cubic feet);
Pijk Existing schedule, two when ship j of type Big Deck was assigned to ARG
k, one when ship j of type LPD or LSD was assigned to ARG k, zero
otherwise;
Decision Variables (Units)
Xijk Proposed schedule, one when ship j of type i is assigned to ARG k, zero
otherwise;
WT Worst-case base troop capacity of all ARGs in proposed schedule (troops);
WV Worst-case net vehicle capacity of all ARGs in proposed schedule (square
feet);
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WC Worst-case net cargo capacity of all ARGs in proposed schedule (cubic
feet);
Formulation
MAX WT + WV /(XZ Vehicle tj /££ Troop tJ j + WC/f^Y. CarZ v /ZZ^^ >
+IZEV* ( 1 )
' j k
Subject To:
YYX lJk TrooPlJ >WT V*. (2)




Constraint (2) measures the worst-case or smallest base troop capacity of all the
ARGs in the schedule. Constraint (3) measures the worst-case or smallest net vehicle
capacity of all the ARGs in the schedule. Constraint (4) measures the worst-case or
smallest net cargo capacity of all the ARGs in the schedule.
Constraint (5) ensures each ship is scheduled at most once. Constraint (6) ensures
that each ARG has at most one ship of each type.
The objective function (1) consists of four different terms. The first three terms
simultaneously maximize the worst-case base troop capacity (WT), worst-case net
vehicle capacity (WV), and the worst-case net cargo capacity (WC). Dividing WV by
(sum of net vehicle capacity/sum of net troop capacity) and dividing WC by (sum of net
cargo capacity/sum of net troop capacity) converts these terms to troop equivalent units
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and it also scales all three terms so they are equally important. In this format the model
will raise WT, WV, and WC to their maximum but one of these may dominate one or
both of the others. If one of these lift capacities is determined to be more important by
the user, then that lift capacity can be multiplied in the objective function by a coefficient
larger than one (a coefficient of three is suggested) and the selected lift capacity will
dominate the other two.
The fourth term of the objective function (1), the sum of XykPp provides a
negligible value and is used only as a tiebreaker. When this term is "large" it means that
schedule changes are fewest. Without this term there may be more than one resulting
ARG schedule that provides the same maximum objective value. Therefore, if there is
more than one possible answer, the fourth term of the objective function selects the ARG
schedule with the fewest changes from the existing schedule. Also, as a result, all ships
of one type remain in the same ARG as in the existing schedule. To ensure that all big
decks (instead of LPDs or LSDs) remain in the same ARG as in the existing schedule, P^
is a value of two (instead of one) for ship j of type Big Deck when it was assigned to
ARG k in the existing schedule and zero otherwise.
D. PROPOSED AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS
1. Pacific Fleet Results
CPG-3 presently has twelve amphibious ships available for ARGs in six-month
deployments: four big decks, four LPDs and four LSDs. The following are the results of
the model (without lift capacity coefficients) compared to the existing ARG schedule;
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Essex 1631 20603 92767
Cleveland 659 11361 29821
Harpers Ferry 405 13944 50386
2695 45908 172974
Boxer 1688 20603 92767
Ocxten 724 11560 32751
Pearl Harbor 406 18770 43520
2818 50934 169038
Peleliu 1903 23686 101649
Juneau 682 11203 31221
Comstock 402 17287 4305
2987 52176 137176
Tarawa 1895 23384 101649
Denver 673 13208 36387
Mount Vernon 299 14555 1303
2867 51147 139339
ARGAVG 2842 50041 154632
STDDEV 121 2808 18996








Essex 1631 20603 92767
Ogden 724 11550 32751
Pearl Harbor 406 18770 43520
2761 50934 169038
Boxer 1688 20603 92767
Denver 673 13208 36387
Comstock 402 17287 4305
2763 51098 133459
Peleliu 1903 23686 101649
Cleveland 659 11361 29821
Harpers Ferry 405 13944 50386
2967 48991 181857
Tarawa 1895 23384 101649
Juneau 682 11203 31221
Mount Vernon 299 14555 1303
2876 49142 134173
ARGAVG 2842 50041 154632
STDDEV 99 1129 24601







While the worst-case net vehicle capacity and worst-case base troop capacity
were improved, the worst-case net cargo capacity went down. In this case, net cargo
capacity was dominated by the other two lift capacities. An overall improvement of only
2.15% is not expected to justify disruptions to the current ARG schedule. If however, the
net vehicle capacity or base troop capacity is insufficient in the existing Essex ARG then
the proposed schedule will provide the most overall improvement.
If only one lift capacity is important to the user, then the best possible worst-case
result for that lift capacity has been determined. Each lift capacity is maximized one at a
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time, and the results are provided in the table below in the individual best column. All
three individual best results cannot be achieved at one time.
WT WV WC
Individual Best 2761 49450 138706
Since, in the original model without coefficients, the worst-case cargo capacity
(WC) was reduced, a solution increasing WC is provided. The final model considers the
possibility that WC is more important than the other two lift capacities, and WV is more
important than WT. To achieve this hierarchy, the coefficients of 0.5, 1.0, and 3.0 are
used in the following objective function and the results of the model are provided below.
MAX (5)WT^WV/(Y4YyehicH /YLTro°P'j HO)WC/(Y^CarS9,/YLTro°P>j
)













Essex 1631 20603 92767
Cleveland 659 11361 29821
Harpers Ferry 405 13944 50386
2695 45908 172974
Boxer 1688 20603 92767
Ogden 724 11560 32751
Pearl Harbor 406 18770 43520
2818 50934 169038
Peleliu 1903 23686 101649
Juneau 682 11203 31221
Comstock 402 17287 4305
2987 52176 137176
Tarawa 1895 23384 101649
Denver 673 13208 36387
Mount Vernon 299 14555 1303
2867 51147 139339
ARGAVG 2842 50041 154632
STDDEV 121 2808 18996








Essex 1631 20603 92767
Juneau 682 11203 31221
Pearl Harbor 406 18770 43520
2719 50577 167508
Boxer 1688 20603 92767
Cleveland 659 11361 29821
Harpers Ferry 405 13944 50386
2752 45908 172974
Peleliu 1903 23686 101649
Ogden 724 11560 32751
Comstock 402 17287 4305
3029 52533 138706
Tarawa 1895 23384 101649
Denver 673 13208 36387
Mount Vernon 299 14555 1303
2867 51147 139339
ARGAVG 2842 50041 154632
STDDEV 140 2875 18164







Once again the improvement is negligible. As long as the existing schedule meets
the lift requirements of an ARG six-month deployment, then this small improvement
does not justify disruptions to the current ARG schedule. If however, the net cargo
capacity of 137,176 cubic feet is insufficient for the Peleliu ARG then the proposed
schedule will provide the best possible improvement.
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In addition, using the model has demonstrated that both WV and WC cannot both
be simultaneously improved from the existing schedule. If improving one, the best that
can be done with the other is to maintain the status quo.
The table below provides a summary of results in this section for the Pacific Fleet
(CPG-3); the existing schedule, results from both models, and the individual best for each
lift capacity.
WT WV WC
Existing Schedule 2695 45905 137176
Model without Coefficients 2761 48991 133459
Individual Best 2761 49450 138706
Model with Coefficients 2719 45908 138706
2. Atlantic Fleet Results
CPG-2 presently has eighteen amphibious ships available for ARGs in six-month
deployments: five big decks, five LPDs and eight LSDs. With more LSDs than any other
type of ship, the question arises of how to best utilize all the LSDs. Historically, big deck
and LPD combinations have remained the same in a five-ARG rotation, while LSD
assignments have fluctuated due to their greater numbers and longer interdeployment
periods. The rotation for the LSDs is not consistent since LSDs are sometimes used for a
UNITAS six-month deployment. When the model is used for these eighteen ships it will
choose the five LSDs that will provide the best results; three LSDs will not be utilized.
a. Two Ship Combinations
It is first assumed that CPG-2 wishes to continue to rotate all LSDs in the
ARG schedule. The logical use of the model then is to determine the Big Deck and LPD
combinations that achieve the best results, and let the LSDs fall where they may in their
rotation. For purposes of comparison a typical schedule was used.
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BIG DECK - LPD COMBINATIONS TO OPTIMIZE WORST-CASE LIFT CAPACITY
TYPICAL ARG SCHEDULE PROPOSEDARGSCHEDULE
Base NET NET Base NET NET
Troops Vehicles Cargo Troops Vehicles Cargo
Nassau 1903 27189 1333% Nassau 1903 27189 133396
Nashville 659 13105 30809 Nashville 659 13105 30809
2562 40294 164205 2562 40294 164205
Kearsarge 1894 21546 106820 Kearsarge 1894 21546 106820
Ponce 728 12567 31334 Ponce 728 12567 31334
2622 34112 138154 2622 34112 138154
Bataan 1737 21297 93423 Bataan 1737 21297 93423
Shreveport 665 12956 30365 Austin 727 11884 34334
2402 34253 123788 2464 33181 127757
Wasp 1894 19763 92767 Wasp 1894 19763 92767
Trenton 721 13930 36195 Trenton 721 13930 36195
2615 33694 128962 2615 33694 128962
Saipan 1904 27189 124627 Saipan 1904 27189 124627
Austin 727 11884 34334 Shreveport 665 12956 30365
2631 39073 158961 2569 40145 154991
ARGAVG 2566 36285 142814 ARGAVG 2566 36285 142814
STDDEV 96 3139 17985 STDDEV 73 3338 16939







While the worst-case net cargo capacity and worst-case troop capacity were
improved, the worst-case net vehicle capacity went down. In this case, net vehicle
capacity was dominated by the other two lift capacities. An overall improvement of only
1.42% is not expected to justify disruptions to the current ARG schedule. If however, the
net cargo capacity or base troop capacity in the current schedule is insufficient, then the
proposed schedule will provide the most overall improvement.
Net cargo capacity and net troop capacity in the proposed schedule is the best that
can possibly be achieved. In a second attempt, using a coefficient of three with WV in
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the objective function ensures that net vehicle capacity dominates and the following
results can be achieved. These results are only a slight improvement from the typical
schedule. The only difference from the typical schedule is that the Shreveport will
deploy with the Kearsarge and the Ponce will deploy with the Bataan.
WT WV WC
WV Dominating 2465 33694 124757
Improvement 2.62% 0.00% 0.78%
Overall Improvement 1.14%
b. FIFTEEN SHIP AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP SCHEDULE
If CPG-2 desires to choose only the best fifteen ships to use in the ARG
schedule then this model can be used to determine that schedule. In addition the results
are expected to show the three LSDs that contribute least to lift capacity of the ARG
schedule. For purposes of comparison a typical schedule was used.
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Nassau 1903 27189 133396
Nashville 659 13105 30809
Pensacola 303 9839 2940
2865 50133 167144
Kearsarge 1894 21546 106820
Ponce 728 12567 31334
Carter Hall 405 20812 51722
3027 54924 189876
Bataan 1737 21297 93423
Shreveport 665 12956 30365
Oak Hill 405 18280 43660
2807 52533 167448
Wasp 1894 19763 92767
Trenton 721 13930 36195
Portland 276 13683 1394
2891 47377 130356
Saipan 1904 27189 124627
Austin 727 11884 34334
Tortuga 393 17301 4305
3024 56373 163266
ARG AVG 2923 52268 163618
STD DEV 99 3621 21349








Nassau 1903 27189 133396
Nashville 659 13105 30809
Tortuga 393 17301 4305
2955 57595 168510
Kearsarge 1894 21546 106820
Trenton 721 13930 36195
Gunston Ha 404 17301 4305
3019 52777 147320
Bataan 1737 21297 93423
Ponce 728 12567 31334
Oak Hill 405 18280 43660
2870 52144 168417
Wasp 1894 19763 92767
Shreveport 665 12956 30365
Carter Hall 405 20812 51722
2964 53531 174854
Saipan 1904 27189 124627
Austin 727 11884 34334
Ashland 408 17301 4305
3039 56373 163266
ARG AVG 2969 54484 164473
STD DEV 62 2455 12020








Whidbey Isl 399 16945 4305
Ashland 408 17301 4305
Gunston He 404 17301 4305
LSDs NOlrUSED
Whidbey Isl 399 16945 4305
Portland 276 13683 1394
Pensacola 303 9839 2940
Base troop capacity and net cargo capacity both reached their highest possible
value and dominated net vehicle capacity. Net vehicle capacity almost reached its
highest possible value of 52,682. In this case all three lift capacities showed
improvement. Improvements of thirteen- percent for net cargo capacity, over ten-percent
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for net cargo capacity, and over eight-percent for overall improvement are all quite
considerable.
These results show that when all LSDs are used in a rotation cycle there is a
significant amount of lift capacity that is sacrificed in some ARGs. The Portland and the
Pensacola clearly contribute least to lift capacity. The Pensacola is scheduled for
decommissioning in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999, so little argument is necessary
to remove the Pensacola from the ARG schedule. If the Portland (or the Pensacola) must
be left in the rotation, it should not be scheduled to deploy with the Wasp or Bataan
ARGs. It is preferred that the Portland be scheduled with the Saipan or Nassau ARGs.
Since the Whidbey Island, Ashland, Gunston Hall, and the Tortuga have similar lift
capacities any one of these ships could be substituted for another. The Whidbey Island
can be used to replace these other three other ships in the schedule with little change to
the worst-case lift capacity.
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VII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. BROKEN STOWAGE FACTORS
Vehicle and cargo broken stowage factors for all ship classes can most accurately








The results of this thesis are in agreement with the 1990 DoN Lift Study for
Vehicle broken stowage factor. Cargo broken stowage factor, however, is a significant
decrease from the 1990 DoN Lift Study. A large portion (80-90%) of cargo spaces
onboard amphibious ships is for ammunition. The compatibility restrictions of
ammunition may explain the lower result for the cargo broken stowage factor. After
these results were achieved, it was discovered that the same result of 0.64 was observed
during Desert Storm for ammunition on breakbulk/container type ships (not exactly the
same, but similar to amphibious ships) according to the Military Traffic Management
Command in their Logistics Handbook for Strategic Mobility Planning. (MTMCTEA
REFERENCE 97-700-2)
B. LANDING CRAFT
The following Notional Landing Craft Load-out Table lists the expected landing
craft embarked on each class of ship for a six-month deployment.
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Six-Month Deployment











The expected preboat load-outs for LCACs and LCUs average 985 and 1490
square feet respectively.
C. NET LIFT CAPACITIES OF SHIPS AND CLASS AVERAGES TABLE
The net capacity for each ship is determined by applying the above planning
factors to gross lift values provided in the Gross Capacities of Ships and Class Averages
Table in Appendix B. Troop bunks are the same value for gross and net. Net cargo
capacity (cubic footage) is determined by multiplying the gross cargo capacity by the
cargo broken stowage factor.
Net vehicle capacity (square footage) is determined by multiplying the gross
vehicle capacity by the vehicle broken stowage factor and then adding preboat load-out.
Preboat load-out is determined by multiplying the notional landing craft load-out value
by the expected preboat load-out for the appropriate landing craft.
N tV h' 1 f Gross Vehicle BrokenY fNotional Landing Expected Preboat^
^Vehicle ' Stowage FactorJ
^
Craft Load- out Load- out J
The following example shows the net vehicle capacity determined for the Ponce
(LPD-15).
12,332 = (15,824 x 0.70)+{l x 1,255)
52
The resulting Net Capacities of Ships and Class Averages Table is provided in
Appendix E.
D. DETERMINING AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS (ARGs)
With respect to the linear programming model discussed in Chapter VI, two
conclusions can be drawn. First, the model itself would be of greater value when
circumstances dictate that an ARG's lift capacity is given priority over other scheduling
considerations. Second, the ARG lift capacity in the Atlantic Fleet can be significantly
improved by simply removing the Pensacola and the Portland from the ARG schedule.
E. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Each ship should be able to maintain accurate capacity figures in its SLCP. In
each SLCP, capacities in the Troop Cargo Capacities (section I) and the Troop Cargo
Space Capability Breakdown (section VIII) should be in agreement. It is recommended
that the validated capacities maintained by the CCOs at CNSL or CNSP be referred to
when updating SLCPs. While it is recognized that every ship is different, it is
nonetheless recommended that the Detailed Gross Capacities Table in Appendix C be
utilized to provide consistency in compartments, cargo types, and capacities reported
within ships in a class.
Review of Appendix C will show some disparities between SLCP totals and
CNS(P/L) data. Given only these references and an inability to remeasure amphibious
ship capacities, the correct capacity was determined to the best of the author's ability. It
may be advisable to reexamine the SLCPs and capacities when a disparity exists.
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Correctly interpreting EPMRs became the most difficult part of this thesis. The
results of this thesis are dependent on the accuracy of these EPMRs. Presently the lift
summary of the EPMR provides square footage and cubic footage of the different cargo
categories of an entire ship. When a cargo category was reported in both square footage
and cubic footage, it sometimes could not be determined if cargo was reported using both
measurements or if two different groups of cargo were being reported. It was apparent
that different CCOs were using different methods. It may be helpful to divide the lift
summary into two sections, cargo stowage areas and vehicle stowage areas. It may also
be helpful for the Pacific Fleet to adopt the Atlantic Fleet method of reporting square
footage and cubic footage in the Organizational Recap section of the EPMR.
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
ARG - Amphibious Ready Group
BSF - Broken Stowage Factor is applied to the available space for embarkation due to
the loss between boxes, between vehicles, around stanchions, and over cargo.
(Joint Pub 3-02.2)
Big Deck - refers to an LPH, LHA, or LHD.
CCO - Combat Cargo Officer is an embarkation officer assigned to major amphibious
ships or naval staffs, functioning primarily as an adviser to and representative of
the naval commander in matters pertaining to embarkation and debarkation of
troops and their supplies and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)
CNSL - Commander, Naval Surface Forces U.S. Atlantic Beet (COMNAVSURFLANT)
CNSP - Commander, Naval Surface Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC)
Combat Loading - The arrangement of personnel and the storage of equipment and
supplies in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of
the organization embarked. Each individual item is stowed so that it can be
unloaded at the required time. (Joint Pub 1-02)
CPG - Commander Amphibious Group (COMPHIBGRU), the commander of a
PHIBGRU will normally have amphibious squadrons (PHEBRONs)
administratively assigned to it. In addition the PHIBGRU is capable of
simultaneous tactical control of assigned units in executing all phases of an
amphibious operation, up to and including a Marine Expeditionary Force-size or
equivalent organization if required. (Joint Pub 3-02.2)
Detailed Load Plans - All of the individually prepared documents which, taken together,
present in detail all instructions for the arrangement of personnel, and the
loading of equipment for one or more units or other special grouping of
personnel or material moving by highway, water, rail or air transportation.
(Joint Pub 1-02)
DFM - Diesel Fuel Marine
DoN - Department of the Navy
EPMR - Embarked Personnel Material Report gives a consolidated, concise and up-to-
date report of embarked personnel, equipment, and cargo. It is sent by message
from each amphibious ship upon departure for a deployment or exercise.
JP-5 - Aviation Fuel
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GAMS - The General Algebraic Modeling System is a high-level modeling system for
mathematical programming problems. It consists of a language compiler and a
stable of integrated high-performance solvers. GAMS is tailored for complex,
large scale modeling applications, and allows you to build large maintainable
models that can be adapted quickly to new situations.
Landing Craft - A craft employed in amphibious operations, specifically designed for
carrying troops and equipment and for beaching, unloading, and retracting.
Also used for logistic cargo resupply operations. Also used for logistic cargo
resupply operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
LCAC - Landing Craft Air Cushion is designed to land heavy vehicles, equipment,
personnel, and cargo in an amphibious assault with the high speeds of a
helicopterborne craft.
LCC - Amphibious Command Ship is a naval ship designed to serve as a floating
command center, providing control facilities for embarked sea, air, and land
commanders and their staffs.
LCM-8 - Landing Craft Mechanized designed to land heavy vehicles, equipment,
personnel, and cargo in an amphibious assault.
LCU - Landing Craft Utility designed to land heavy vehicles, equipment, personnel,
and cargo in an amphibious assault.
LFORM - Landing Forces Operational Reserve Material
LPD - Amphibious Transport Dock is a naval ship designed to transport and launch
loaded amphibious craft and vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel
in amphibious assault, and to render limited docking and repair service to small
ships and craft; and one that is capable of acting as a control ship in an
amphibious assault
LPH - Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter) is a naval ship designed to transport and
land troops and their essential helicopter transportable equipment and supplies
by means of embarked helicopters during and amphibious assault.
LHA - Amphibious Assault Ship (general purpose) is a naval ship designed to embark,
deploy, and land elements of a Marine landing force in an amphibious assault
by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or a combination of these
methods. (Joint Pub 1-02)
LHD - Amphibious Assault Ship (multipurpose) is a naval ship designed to embark,
deploy, and land elements of a Marine landing force in an amphibious assault
by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or a combination of these
methods.
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LSD - Dock Loading Ship is a naval ship designed to transport and launch loaded
amphibious craft and vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel in
amphibious assault, and to render limited docking and repair service to small
ships and craft; and one that is capable of acting as a control ship in an
amphibious assault. (Joint Pub 1-02)
LST - Tank Landing Ship is a naval ship designed to run up to the beach, lower their
extended bow ramp, and offload tanks, artillery, and logistic vehicles.
MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task Force is a task organization of Marine forces
(division, aircraft wing and service support groups) under a single command
and structured to accomplish a specific mission. The Marine Air-Ground Task
Force components will normally include command, aviation combat, ground
combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy Support
Elements) (Joint Pub 1-02)
MOGAS - Motor Gasoline
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Outsized Cargo - cargo that is larger than the generally accepted "standard pallet," and
may be either mounted on a pallet or skids. It also includes large items that are
not classified as vehicles, but must be considered separately due to
handling/stowage requirements.
POL - Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
Preboat - The load-out or vehicle and cargo carrying capacity of landing craft carried in
amphibious ships.
Primary Control Ship - In amphibious operations, a ship of the task force designated to
control the movement of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and landing ships
to and from a beach.
Regular Cargo - this thesis uses this term to refer to all cargo that is not classified as
Outsized cargo.
SLCP - Ship's Loading Characteristic Pamphlet
Undesignated Cargo - this thesis uses this term to refer to cargo where the location of
stowage cannot be determined for certain. It could be stowed in either vehicle
or cargo stowage areas.
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APPENDIX B. GROSS CAPACITIES OF SHIPS AND CLASS AVERAGES TABLE
Gross Gross SLCP




Bulk POL (GAL) Approval
DateBase | Surge Total MOGAS DFM JP5
LHD1 Wasp 1894 211 2105 24012 144948 1882249 484310 910201
LHD2 Essex 1631 182 1813 25212 144948 1882249 484310 970730
LHD3 Kearsarge 1894 213 2107 26558 166906 1897777 439685 960101
LHD4 Boxer 1688 184 1872 25212 144948 1882249 484310 961016
LHD5 Bataan 1737 184 1921 26203 145973 1854710 604915 971201
avq:;: 1769 195 1964 25439 149545 1S79847 499506:
LHAl Tarawa 1895 1895 24891 158827 8000 N/A 415940 970701
LHA2 Saipan 1904 1904 30327 194729 10865 N/A 417000 971201
LHA3 Belleau Wood 1904 1904 23120 116111 8000 N/A 415940 960601
LHA4 Nassau 1903 1903 30327 208431 10847 N/A 417009 961001
LHA5 Peleliu 1903 1903 25323 158827 8000 N/A 400000 980201
AVG 1902 m : : :1902 26798: 167385 9142 mm : 413178-
LPH2 Guam 1542 206 1748 4036 47315 834000 290000 960207
AVG :il542 206 1748 4036: 47315 :: 834000 ; :.:.:; 290000:
LPD4 Austin 727 188 915 14848 53647 21375 725975 205943 971201
LPD5 Ogden 724 202 926 14386 51174 23510 763199 236390 961112
LPD6 Duluth 698 221 919 16174 58869 18000 736199 216791 980201
LPD7 Cleveland 659 179 838 14102 46596 22114 ? 282265 980201
LPD8 Dubuque 674 184 858 13857 56823 22069 763199 278913 960401
LPD9 Denver 673 178 851 16740 56854 20000 780337 283000 951209
LPD10 Juneau 682 178 860 13876 48783 23114 712531 303055 ?
LPD12 Shreveport 665 176 841 16380 47445 23000 828366 332000 970301
LPD13 Nashville 659 208 867 16593 48139 22114 828337 333529 970601


















LSD49 Harpers Ferry 405 101 506 17105 78728 797764 50000 960816
LSD50 Carter Hall 405 101 506 26917 80816 755658 53230 961001
LSD51 Oak Hill 405 101 506 23300 68219 795701 53230 970915
AVG 405 101 506 22441 75921 783041 52153:
LSD41 Whidbey Island 399 100 499 18578 6727 797764 53000 970515
LSD42 Germantown 403 101 504 19087 6727 797764 53000 960301
LSD43 Fort McHenry 413 100 513 19087 6727 797764 53000 960301
LSD44 Gunston Hall 404 101 505 19087 6727 796164 50569 971201
LSD45 Comstock 402 102 504 19067 6727 838079 53000 970701
LSD46 Tortuga 393 102 495 19087 6727 797764 53000 940322
LSD47 Rushmore 403 101 504 19067 6727 ? 53000 ?
LSD48 Asliland 408 101 509 19087 6727 838081 53230 970311
AVG:- :.HI 101 r-504 1 19018 :6727 :H943897;:: 52725
LSD36 Anchorage 334 334 17712 2753 N/A 31396 ?
LSD39 Mount Vernon 299 58 357 16572 2036 N/A 31396 ?
LSD40 Fort Fisher 248 72 320 17712 2044 N/A 31396 ?
AVG LSD36M Class 294 43 337 17332 2278 N/A 31396'
LSD37 Portland 276 64 340 16733 2178 949232 31386 960531
LSD38 Pensacola 303 20 323 11242 4593 920676 31387 970915
AVG LSD36 Class 290 42 332 13988 3386 934954 31387
LST1184 Frederick 314 72 386 17501 4356 7197 229000 19055 ?
LST 1 194 La Moure County 315 68 383 16609 4339 7197 310000 19000 971201
AVG 315 70 385 17055 4348 7197 269500 19027.5
TOTALS 34,034 4,749 38,783 769,323 2,509,686 296,116 30,152,951 8,830,601
TOTALS w/o Guam & Ft Fisher 32,244 4,471 36,715 747,575 2,460,327 296,116 29,318,951 8,540,601
LCC19 Blue Ridge 224 224 N/A 15056 N/A ? ?
LCC20 Mount Whitney 209 209 2336 17539 N/A 120399 971201
AVG 217 217 2336 16298 N/A 120399
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APPENDIX C. DETAILED GROSS CAPACITIES TABLE
Vehicle Square Feet
Compartment Wasp Essex Kearsarge Boxer Bataan
3rd Deck 14974 16174 14974 14974 N/A
1st Platform 9038 9038 9038 9038 N/A
SLCP Total 24012 25212 24012 24012
Gross used in Appendix B 24012 25212 26558 25212 26203
CNS(P/L) 24012 25212 26558 25212 N/A
1990 DoN Lift 25500 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Cargo Cubic Feet
Cargo Type Wasp Essex Kearsarge Boxer Bataan
Ammunition 119860 119860 139697 119860 N/A
Pyrotechnics 2909 2909 3317 2909 N/A
Jettisonable Lockers 21 21 25 21 N/A
POL (Packaged) 22158 22158 23867 22158 N/A
SLCP Total 144948 144948 166906 144948
Gross used in Appendix B 144948 144948 166906 144948 158827
CNS(P/L) 144948 144948 166906 144948 N/A
1990 DoN Lift 166600 N/A N/A N/A N/A
This Line Considered to be Actual
This Line Considered to be Actual
LHA
Vehicle Square Feet
Compartment Tarawa Saipan Belleau W< Nassau Peleliu
3rd Deck 16161 21197 17941 21197 16161
1st Platform 9130 5179 9130
4th Deck 8730 9162
SLCP Total 24891 30327 23120 30327 25323
Gross used in Appendix B 24891 30327 23120 30327 25323
CNS(P/L) 24891 36163 23120 36163 24891
1990 DoN Lift 28700 28700 28700 28700 28700
Cairgo Cubic 1 >et
Cargo Type Tarawa Saipan Belleau W< Nassau Peleliu
General 18330 62252 23859 55442 23849
Ammunition 118709 121900 83324 141755 128580
Pyrotechnics 2700 2160 2700




POL (Packaged) 9759 10485 6768 11234 9217
SLCP Total 159634 194729 116111 208431 164346
Gross, used in Appendix B 158827 194729 116111 208431 158827
CNS(P/L) 158827 208237 116111 208431 158827
1990 DoN Lift 128200 146200 137400 146600 147700
This Line Considered to be Actual
This Line Considered to be Actual
The First Platform (Aft) on the Saipan and Nassau is a dual purpose space. The after portion is equipped with
cargo tie-down tracks for stowage of outsized or heavy lift cargo. The SLCP totals assume this space is used for




Compartment Austin Ogden Duluth Cleveland Dubuque Denver Juneau Shreveport Nashville Trenton Ponce
Upper Vehicle 6960 7128 7625 6727 5911 7110 6549 7343 7556 8736 7452
Lower Vehicle 7888 7258 8549 7375 7946 9630 7327 9037 9037 9036 8372
SLCP Total 14848 14386 16174 14102 13857 16740 13876 16380 16593 17772 15824
Gross. used in Appendix B 14848 14386 16174 14102 13857 16740 13876 16380 16593 17772 15824
CNS(P/L) 14848 14083 14083 14102 13858 12329 13876 16380 16593 17772 15824
DoN Lift 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000 14000
Cargo Cubic Feet
Cargo Type Austin Ogden Duluth Cleveland Dubuque Denver Juneau Shreveport Nashville Trenton Ponce
Ammunition 47129 44672 50780 41061 55368 50276 42100 41394 42319 43148 42977
Pyrotechnics 1502 1280 933 753 975 989 994 842 842 1088 968
Demo 531 457 337 456 460 492 357 357 492 421
Jettison Lockers 354 40 360 371 24 384 480 42 50 64
Special Weapons 4662 4651 6339 4074 4745 4717 4810 4571 4312 4459
POL (Packaged) 7515
SLCP Total 53647 51174 58869 46596 56823 56854 48783 47445 48139 56555 48889
Gross, used in Appendix B 53647 51174 58869 46596 56823 56854 48783 47445 48139 56555 48960
CNS(P/L) 53647 51174 51188 51188 56553 56845 48783 47445 48139 56555 48960
1990 DoN Lift 55900 46200 55500 48200 51000 49700 50100 56000 50900 49800 48800
LSD-49
Vehicle Square Feet
Compartment Harpers Fe Carter Hall Oak Hill
Flight Deck 5830 7925 7808
Truck Tunnel 1184 1184
Boat Deck 3738 3245 3615
Vehicle Turning Area 713 2227 1565
Vehicle Stowage Area 6824 12336 9128
SLCP Total 17105 26917 23300
Gross, used in Appendix B 17105 26917 23300
CNS(P/L) 14127 26917 23505
1990 DoN Lift 20200 N/A N/A
Cairgo Cubic I'eet
Cargo Type Harpers Fe Carter Hall Oak Hill
General Cargo 13158 18966 12070
Ammunition 61868 57846 51427
Pyrotechnics 316 88
Demo 18 16
Jettison Lockers 4 1
Lithium Batteries 82 64
POL (Packaged) 3702 3584 2901
SLCP Total 78728 80816 66567
Gross, used in Appendix B 78728 80816 68219
CNS(P/L) 50777 80816 68219
1990 DoN Lift 67600 N/A N/A
This Line considered to be Actual




Compartment Whidbev I: Germantov Fort McHe Gunston H Comstock Tortuga Rushmore Ashland
Flight Deck 7935 8444 8444 8444 8440 8444 N/A 8444
Stbd Deck/Tunnel 2389 2389 2389 2389 2389 2389 N/A 2389
Turntable 1018 1018 1018 1018 1002 1018 N/A 2016
Well Deck w/4 LCACs 7236 7236 7236 7236 7236 7236 N/A 7236
SLCP Total 18578 19087 19087 19087 19067 19087 20085
Gross, used in Appendix B 18578 19087 19087 19087 19067 19087 19067 19087
CNS(P/L) 18431 19067 19067 18431 19067 18431 19067 18431
1990 DoN Lift 14600 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Cargo Cubic Feet
Cargo Type Whidbey Is Germantov Fort McHe Gunston H Comstock Tortuga Rushmore Ashland
Ammunition 3924 3924 3924 3924 3924 3924 N/A 3924
Pyrotechnics 396 396 396 396 396 396 N/A 396
Demo 598 598 598 598 598 598 N/A 598
Thermite Grenade Lkr 16 N/A
Lithium Batteries 84 N/A
Jettison Lockers 4 84 4 84 N/A 84
POL (Packaged) 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 N/A 1725
SLCP Total 6743 6643 6647 6727 6647 6727 6727
Gross, used in Appendix B 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727
CNS(P/L) 6691 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727 6727
1990 DoN Lift 6807 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
This Line considered Actual
This Line considered Actual
Subtracting Whidbey Island, Thermite Grenade Lkr from Total achieves 6727
Well Deck data is with 4 LCACs different than 90 DoN Lift notional lift
LSD-36M
Vehicle Square Feet
Compartment Anchorage Mount Ver Fort Fisher
Super Deck N/A N/A 3865
Flight Deck N/A N/A 4661
Mezzanine Deck N/A N/A 7052
SLCP Total 15578
Gross, used in Appendix B 17712 16572 17712
CNS(P/L) 17712 16572 17712
1990 DoN Lift 8800 8800 8800
Cargo Cubic Feet
Cargo Type Anchorage Mount Ver Fort Fisher
General Cargo N/A N/A
Ammunition N/A N/A 1853
Pyrotechnics N/A N/A
Demo N/A N/A 99
Jettison Lockers N/A N/A 92
Thermite Lockers N/A N/A
SLCP Total 2044
Gross, used in Appendix B 2753 2036 2044
CNS(P/L) 2753 2036 2044






















This Line considered to be Actual
This Line considered to be Actual
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APPENDIX E. NET CAPACITIES OF SHIPS AND CLASS AVERAGES TABLE
Net Net




LHD1 Wasp 1894 211 2105 19763 92767
LHD2 Essex 1631 182 1813 20603 92767
LHD3 Kearsarge 1894 213 2107 21546 106820
LHD4 Boxer 1688 184 1872 20603 92767
LHD5 Bataan 1737 184 1921 21297 93423
AVG 1769 195 1964 20763 95709
LHA1 Tarawa 1895 1895 23384 101649
LHA2 Saipan 1904 1904 27189 124627
LHA3 Belleau Wood 1904 1904 22144 74311
LHA4 Nassau 1903 1903 27189 133396
LHA5 Peleliu 1903 1903 23686 101649
AVO 1902 1902 24718 : 107126
LPD4 Austin 727 188 915 11884 34334
LPD5 Ogden 724 202 926 11560 32751
LPD6 Duluth 698 221 919 12812 37676
LPD7 Cleveland 659 179 838 11361 29821
LPD8 Dubuque 674 184 858 11190 36367
LPD9 Denver 673 178 851 13208 36387
LPD10 Juneau 682 178 860 11203 31221
LPD12 Shreveport 665 176 841 12956 30365
LPD13 Nashville 659 208 867 13105 30809
LPD14 Trenton 721 198 919 13930 36195
LPD15 Ponce 728 192 920 12567 31334
AVG 692 inm 883 ;: 12343 : 33387
LSD49 Harpers Ferry 405 101 506 13944 50386
LSD50 Carter Hall 405 101 506 20812 51722
LSD51 Oak Hill 405 101 506 18280 43660
LSD52 Pearl Harbor 406 102 508 18770 43520
AVG 405 101 507 17951 47322
LSD41 Whidbey Island 399 100 499 16945 4305
LSD42 Germantown 403 101 504 17301 4305
LSD43 Fort McHenry 413 100 513 17301 4305
LSD44 Gunston Hall 404 101 505 17301 4305
LSD45 Comstock 402 102 504 17287 4305
LSD46 Tortuga 393 102 495 17301 4305
LSD47 Rushmore 403 101 504 17287 4305
LSD48 Ashland 408 101 509 17301 4305
AVG 403 101 504 17253
;
4305
LSD36 Anchorage 334 334 15353 1762
LSD39 Mount Vernon 299 58 357 14555 1303
AVG LSD36M Class 317- ::;,29: 346 14954 1532
LSD37 Portland 276 64 340 13683 1394
LSD38 Pensacola 303 20 323 9839 2940
AVG LSD36 Class 290 ;i::42:': : : 332 11761 ii§ii
LST1184 Frederick 314 72 386 12251 2788
LST 1194 La Moure County 315 68 383 11626 2777
AVG 315 70 385 1 1939 2782
TOTALS 32,650 4,573 37,223 650,318 1,618,129
73
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Draft, Maximum (Full Load) 21' 6"
Draft Ballasted 32'
Displacement Tonnage (Full Load) S/T 16,912
Freeboard to Main Deck 33' AFT, 41'11" FWD
Freeboard to Flight Deck 33' ;'-
ORGANIC LANDING CRAFT. BOATS AND HELICOPTERS
LANDING CRAFT HELO





LCU Equivalents : 1
LCAC Equivalents : 1







NAVAL STAFF 1 30 4 54 89
LANDING FORCE
(NORMAL) 79 26 560 665
LANDING FORCE
(SURGE) 176 176
TOTAL 1 109 30 790 930
CREW 30 29 463 522
*No designated E-6 berthing. E-6 berthing included with El /E5.
5. MEDICAL CAPACITIES
Operating Rooms : 1




Isolation Rooms/Beds : 1/4
Recovery Wards/Beds : 1/8






ACTUAL SQFT AND CUFT
GENERAL CARGO NOTE 1 NOTE 1
TOTALS. NO REDUCTION
WAS MADE FOR LFORM,








JETTISONABLE LOCKERS NOTE 2 42





POL (PACKAGED) *** *** ***
JP-5 (BULK) (AVIATION) XXX XXX XXX 332,000
JP-5 (BULK) (GROUND) XXX XXX XXX NOTE 3
MOGAS (BULK) XXX XXX XXX 23,000
DIESEL "DFM" (BULK) XXX XXX XXX
NOTE 3
828,366




AND DOES NOT INCLUDE
WELL DECK, FLIGHT DECK,
AND HANGAR DECK.
FLIGHT DECK 13,809** XXX








NOTE 1 - AMMUNITION HOLDS HAVE OPERATIONAL USE AS CARGO STOWAGE SPACES.
NOTE 2 - THERE ARE 6 JETTISONABLE LOCKERS ON THE CATWALK ADJACENT TO THE FLIGHT
DECK FOR THE STORAGE OF LITHIUM BATTERIES. COORDINATE WITH THE CCO IF
USE OF THESE IS CONTEMPLATED.
NOTE 3 - ALL JP-5 IS FILTERED TWICE AND THEREFORE CLASSIFIED AS AVIATION QUALITY
FUEL. DFM IS DISPENSED TO LANDING FORCE UNITS AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT
MISSION OBJECTIVES. TOTAL DFM LISTED IS THE TOTAL SHIPS CAPACITY.
* - REFER TO SECTION VIII (TROOP CARGO SPACE CAPACITY BREAKDOWN) FOR
DETAILED INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC SPACES.
**
- NOT INCLUDED IN TOTALS.
***
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TROOP CARGO SPACE CAPACITY BREAKDOWN
* General Cargo may be stowed in LFORM Magazine's depending on space
available. General Cargo stowed in these magazines must be
compatible with the LFORM. General Cargo may also be stowed in
Upper Vehicle Stowage in lieu of vehicles. It is also acceptable
to stow a mixture of vehicles and cargo in lower vehicle stowage.
** The special weapons magazine is designated for special situation.
The ship's highly pilferrable LFORM items are stored in this area.
Special permission must be granted from the Commanding Officer of
the ship to use this space.
*** Available space used for cargo/vehicles stowage plus LFORM.
**** Not included in totals.
NOTE 1 There are 6 jettisonable lockers on the catwalks adjacent to the
flight deck for the storage of lithium batteries . Coordinate with
the CCO. if use of these is contemplated.
VIII-2
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APPENDIX G. SAMPLE GAMS CODE AND RESULTS
GAMS 2.25.092 DOS Extended/C














LIMCOL = 0, LIMROW = 0, SOLPRINT = OFF, DECIMALS = 2




Author : LT Eric Williams
Revised: 4/31/98









































type /bigDeck, LPD, LSD/
ship /essex, boxer, peleliu, tarawa, Cleveland, ogden,




















































GAMS 2.25.092 DOS Extended/C 07/11/98 11:49:50 PAGE






63 CARGO (J, I) net cargo capacity for :ship J of type I
















80 1 2 3 4
81 essex . bigDeck 2
82 boxer . bigDeck 2
83 peleliu . bigDeck 2
84 tarawa . bigDeck 2
85 Cleveland . LPD 1
86 ogden . LPD 1
87 juneau. LPD 1
88 denver . LPD 1
89 harpersFe . LSD 1
90 pearlHarb. LSD 1
91 comstock. LSD 1






96 X(I , J,K) assign ship j of type i to ARG k
97
98 VARIABLES
99 Z objective value
100 WT worst case ARG troop capacity
101 wv worst case ARG vehicle capacity






106 OBJ maximize worst case capacities
107 LIFTT(K) worst case troop capacity
108 LIFTV(K) worst case vehic].e capacity
109 LIFTC(K) worst case cargo capacity
110 MINS(J) each ship used at most once
80
GAMS 2.25.092 DOS Extended/C





























MINI(I,K) each ARG has only one ship of each type
* OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
OBJ. .
Z =E= WT+WV/ (SUM (I, SUM (J, VEHICLE (J, I) ) ) /SUM (I , SUM (J, TROOP (J, I) ) ) )+
WC/ (SUM(I,SUM(J,CARGO(J,I) ) ) /SUM (I , SUM (J, TROOP (J, I ) ) ) ) +




SUM(I,SUM(J,TROOP(J,I) *X(I,J,K) ) ) =G= WT;
LIFTV(K) .
SUM(I / SUM(J,VEHICLE(J,I) *X(I, J,K) ) ) =G= WV;
LIFTC(K) .
SUM(I,SUM(J,CARGO(J,I) *X(I, J,K) ) ) =G= WC;
MINS(J) .
.
SUM(I,SUM(K,X(I, J,K) ) ) =L= 1;
MINK I, K) • -
SUM(J,X(I, J,K) ) =L= 1;
MODEL AMPHIB /ALL/
;
SOLVE AMPHIB USING MIP MAXIMIZING Z;
DISPLAY WT.L, WV.L, WC.L, X.L;
COMPILATION TIME 0.880 SECONDS VERID WAT-25-092
GAMS 2.25.092 DOS Extended/C
AMPHIB WORST CASE LIFT OPTIMIZATION SCHEDULE
Model Statistics SOLVE AMPHIB USING MIP FROM LINE 13 6
07/11/98 11:49:50 PAGE
MODEL STATISTICS
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 6
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES 5




GENERATION TIME 3.840 SECONDS
EXECUTION TIME 3.910 SECONDS VERID WAT-25-092
81
GAMS 2.25.092 DOS Extended/C
AMPHIB WORST CASE LIFT OPTIMIZATION SCHEDULE




















* XA Professional Linear Programming System
* Copyright 1991,92,93,94,95,96 by Sunset Software Technology
* All Rights Reserved Worldwide.
* Phone 818-441-1565 FAX 818-441-1567
*************************************************************
Tolerances (OPTCA) (OPTCR)
*** grid of XA Messacies *******************************
REPORT SUMMARY : NONOPT
INFEASIBLE
UNBOUNDED
GAMS 2.25.092 DOS Extended/C







2761.00 worst case ARG troop
capacity
48991.00 worst case ARG
vehicle capacity
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